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Introduction
Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymīya (1263–1328) is still a controversial Islamic jurist and theologian. His 
influence is undeniable. However, the reason behind his influence is far from being clear. My 
main argument is that the main reason for his appeal and thus influence lies in his deliberate 
attempt to construct an Islamic community in which the question of identity appears to be 
fulfilled. In the process of that construction Ibn Taymīya created a certain narrative of Islam 
which has proved difficult to shake. First, Ibn Taymīya reduced ethics to sharīʻa preventing 
the possibility of revisiting sharīʻa in ethical context. Second, reducing the idea of politics to 
political authority in which he integrated with religious discourse, overpowering in the process 
the idea of society. A form of voluntarism even nascent individualism which were attributes of 
early Islamic thought was lost. The only meaningful way to engage Ibn Taymīya’s narrative is 
by transcending it. After all Ibn Taymīya’s narrative was no more than opinion. 
Hans Küng, in his major work on Islam, referred to Ibn Taymīya under the interesting 
sub-heading “the victory of traditionalism” [Küng 2007: 384]. His main observation was 
“that neither Averroes and rational philosophy nor Ibn ‘Arabī and mysticism were to 
have a historical influence on Sunni Islam. That influence came from Ibn Taymīya and 
traditionalism” [Kung 2007: 386]. However, no meaningful explanation was offered. 
Muḥammad al-Jābirī, a leading scholar on Arab-Islamic thought, referred to Ibn Taymīya 
in three different settings. First, he portrayed Ibn Taymīya as a critique of al-Ghazālī’s form 
of sufism and mysticism supporting al-Jābirī’s criticism and attack on al-Ghazālī [al-Jābirī 
1991: 168–169; al-Jābirī 1984: 286]. The other is to suggest that Ibn Taymīya was in fact 
closer to the rationalism of Ibn Rushd (Averroes) than commonly assumed, although al-Jābirī 
himself offered no explanation in support of that view [al-Jābirī 1984: 325; al-Jābirī 1986: 
536]. Finally, al-Jābirī suggested, though never explained, that Ibn Taymīya was motivated in 
his writings by a notion of Arab-Islamic identity, particularly when addressing and rejecting 
Greek logic [al-Jābirī 1984: 259].1
In this article I take al-Jābirī’s hint in reference to the idea of identity in Ibn Taymīya’s 
thought to be my central theme in explaining the reason behind the prevalence and triumph 
of “Ibn Taymīya and traditionalism’. The main reason behind Ibn Taymīya’s appeal lies in 
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1 Muḥammed A. al-Jābirī’s treatment of Ibn Taymīya and other major Islamic jurists, despite its overall 
value, remains very selective and even occasionally misleading. For a critique of al-Jābirī, see Ṭarabishī 
2002. 
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his deliberate and conscious attempt to construct a notion of Islamic community in which 
the unsettling question of identity appears to be answered and fulfilled. Using a method of 
selectivity and repetition Ibn Taymīya leaves his reader overwhelmed by the weight of data 
and details. Ibn Taymīya’s method was to mobilize as much as to convince. One can see in Ibn 
Taymīya’s method an early and systematic use of propaganda. Repetition creates conviction. 
In developing his notion of community Ibn Taymīya used and utilized to the fullest 
extent attributes of difference and partiality as defining features of the Islamic community. 
David Hume long recognized human nature related to a form of vanity [Hume 1969: 299–
311]. Immanuel Kant also suggested that “partiality, the tendency to make exception on one’s 
behalf or one’s own case, is the central human weakness from which all other flow” [Gellner 
1983: 2]. Difference and exceptionalism, the other attributes of identifying communities, is 
equally common among various ideologies and doctrines including most significantly those 
related to nationalism [Gellner 1983; al-Dūrī 1984; Huntington 2004].2
In religion, Ibn Taymīya adopted and advocated the notions of partiality, difference, and 
exceptionalism which led to the creation and intellectual support of dogma and fanaticism. 
Non-religious doctrines adopting partiality and difference as defining features of communities 
led equally to extreme forms of nationalism, racism, and ethnic cleansing [Scheper-Hughes 
and Bourgois 2004; Diamond 2012: 119–173]. 
Few Islamic theologians attempted revisiting Islamic heritage, Ibn Taymīya was 
no doubt one of them. His thought was, however, fixed on a single notion of community 
which is externally driven and emphasizing an us-them dichotomy. Moral superiority and 
exceptionalism were attributed to Islamic religion and equally significant to the “original” 
Islamic community (salaf). Ibn Taymīya then drew the conclusion that any deviation from 
that community (interpretation or practice) was considered to be a form of innovation (bidʻa) 
and thus un-Islamic. Having asserted and emphasized the principle of moral superiority based 
on difference, Ibn Taymīya had to revisit all major Islamic doctrines from the perspective 
of incompatibility and contrast. This led Ibn Taymīya to rather unusual conclusions, the 
implications of which for Islamic thought are still very much strongly felt. One of these issues 
of contention is the relationship between sharīʻa and ethics. Logic, even common sense, 
would suggest that Islamic ethics provide a framework in which sharīʻa is placed and asserted. 
Ibn Taymīya’s argument is that sharīʻa is what differentiates Islamic community, thus Islam, 
from others (communities/religions). Ethics demonstrate similarity and common attributes; 
sharīʻa highlights what is unique and different. Adhering to sharīʻa in its details and literal 
interpretation is a confirmation of uniqueness of the Islamic community.  
2 Among the most important contemporary Arab scholars who attempted to make the linkage between 
religion and Arab nationalism was the late historian ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Dūrī. See, al-Dūrī 1984. Samuel P. 
Huntington, in his analysis of American nationalism, also highlighted that linkage between religion and 
nationalism. See, Huntington 2004.
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Ibn Taymīya took the notion of the uniqueness of Islamic community to the limit. 
Implementation of sharīʻa, a unique Islamic attribute according to Ibn Taymīya, meant 
establishing order and conformity within and engaging in active promotion of Islam 
externally, hence the centrality of jihād. Jihād was given as proof of the moral superiority of 
the Islamic community. Considering the high value Ibn Taymīya placed on domestic order 
and promotion of Islam, both considered to be attributes of the Islamic community, led him to 
make certain claims about political authority which are questionable. Ibn Taymīya, not unique 
to him but strongly emphasized in his thought, made the assertion that no community could 
exist independent of political authority. Political authority therefore was an integral part of the 
community if not the creator of such a community (order and jihād). The centrality of political 
authority to the notion of community led Ibn Taymīya to moral ambiguity, compromise and 
gray areas. Wrong doing, abuse of authority to its mandate, and even failure to carry out its 
duties were not translated to moral condemnation but rather to an ambiguous principle of 
potential greater evil. His tolerance of potential and actual abuse of political authority was 
not, however, translated into tolerant doctrine. 
Ibn Taymīya’s notion of utilitarianism is also to be approached from the same 
perspective of both order and promotion of Islam, underlying moral superiority of the Islamic 
community. Choosing between actions or attributes which are morally compromising could 
be judged accordingly to a scale of greater and lesser evil of order and jihād. In conclusion I 
examine whether the notion of utility and that of public interest which Ibn Taymīya used and 
utilized could be suitable as an opening for public discourse or not.   
Methodologically, the analytical and synthetic methods were used applying the notion 
of deconstruction and reconstruction. Applying this notion to Ibn Taymīya’s works, the 
following elements are identified: sharīʻa and ethics, jihād, political authority, commanding 
right and forbidding wrong, utilitarianism, and innovation. I will demonstrate that all major 
concepts which Ibn Taymīya used add up and could be reconstructed to form a clear notion of 
community. 
I. Sharīʻa and Ethics
Ibn Taymīya was no doubt a learned jurist, prolific writer and passionate about his subject 
matter. Yet, the quality which Ibn Taymīya lacked most was a sense of irony or appreciation 
of the paradox. That was true of all issues that he covered including that of sharīʻa and ethics. 
Quoting a conversation between Āʼisha, the Prophet’s wife, and an unnamed Iraqi 
individual about how the Qur’an should be read and understood. The Iraqi suggested what 
in our terminology today we would call a reconstruction. Āʼisha responded by emphasizing 
that the sequence of revelation was about faith first and foremost, laying the ground for 
Islamic sharīʻa or law. She explained that if sharīʻa had been first introduced or revealed 
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then very few would have adhered to the faith [Ibn Taymīya 2002: 103–104]. Ibn Taymīya 
made no comment nor meaningful use of such a conversation. In fact, Ibn Taymīya turned 
what potentiality could be a very open and enlightened ethical doctrine on its head. This idea 
that sharīʻa should be placed in an ethical context was essentially rejected by Ibn Taymīya, 
creating a dogmatic Islamic doctrine which has proved to be difficult to break. Ibn Taymīya’s 
argument was that ethics were of no value or meaning independent of sharīʻa. In a way, Ibn 
Taymīya was arguing that sharīʻa was the operational definition of faith.
Ibn Taymīya wrote two books, which, according to the translation given to the titles 
in English, were about ethics. The first title is al-Tuḥfa al-‘Iraqiyya, roughly translated as 
‘the Iraqi Marble’. The other is al-‘Ubūdīya or Submission (to God). The two books are 
elaborations on the idea of love of God. Sincerity is the idea of faith. Sincerity and intention 
are what differentiate between true believers and non-believers [Ibn Taymīya 2005b: 17]. In 
focus and elaboration, however, Ibn Taymīya was more concerned with the manifestation of 
faith, or acting and behaving according to faith, rather than with a concern about the state of 
mind or heart. Islamic faith according to Ibn Taymīya was about “pronouncements and acts” 
[Ibn Taymīya 2002: 160]. “there could never be true faith unless and until believing was 
associated with good deeds” [Ibn Taymīya 2002: 160]. Sincerity was for God to judge, but 
faith was about public acts and pronouncements covering code of dress to that of engaging 
in jihād. In other words, faith was translated by Ibn Taymīya to a manual of mobilization and 
action. Faith is inseparable from acting and behaving according to sharīʻa, God’s law [Ibn 
Taymīya 1997: 54].
This emphasis on acting and behaving according to sharīʻa led Ibn Taymīya to make 
the rather extraordinary claim that the idea of true faith was partial and rather incomplete at 
the early phase of Islam and that faith had become complete and supreme when sharīʻa was 
revealed [Ibn Taymīya 2000 v.1: 342]. Ibn Taymīya, in effect, diluted the distinction between 
ethics and sharīʻa, elevating sharīʻa to the defining feature of faith [Ibn Taymīya 2002: 160]. 
Ibn Taymīya’s definition of the non-believer is that person “who denied sharīʻa” [Ibn Taymīya 
2000 v.1: 487]. 
Recitation of the Qurʼan is acting and behaving according to the Qurʼan, rather than 
mere reading and contemplation [Ibn Taymīya 1997: 19]. The Qurʼan is self evidently true 
and clear, meaning that the Qurʼan was self-illustrative and taken as given. More importantly, 
Sunna, which broadly entailed the Prophet’s acts, manner and sayings as well as those of his 
associates, were taken to mean an operational definition of the Qurʼan itself. Sunna therefore 
was not an appendage to the true faith, but rather an inseparable and essential part of it [Ibn 
Taymīya 1999: 56; Ibn Taymīya 2005b: 67]. According to Ibn Taymīya, Sunna is what makes 
Islam complete and detailed [Ibn Taymīya 2000 v.1: 210, 195].
For Ibn Taymīya, the idea of God is simple, namely, “the one in the sky” [Ibn Taymīya 
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1999: 52]. God’s attributes were also simple and clearly given in the Qur’an. Nothing more 
was needed to be said or discussed hence the irrelevance of rational theologians arguing 
and debating the nature of God [Ibn Taymīya 2000 v.2: 177]. He extended his judgment of 
irrelevance of ahl al-kalām to cover all ideas and modes of thought which do not justify their 
validity without clear and explicit reference to the Qurʼan and Sunna. Nothing good could 
be said of bidʻa (innovation) which, for Ibn Taymīya, was a deviation from the true and only 
path. Heretics asserted that Ibn Taymīya invented the idea of change to discourage people 
from the Qurʼan [Ibn Taymīya 2005b: 73]. They elaborated the obvious and labored in vain. 
They created uncertainty in the mind of the faithful and implanted seeds of discord among 
Muslims. Worst of all they suspended God’s commandment that nothing could be learned 
from people of innovation but evil [Ibn Taymīya 1999: 137].3
Three ethical principles are often mentioned in Ibn Taymīya’s works including; justice, 
commanding right and forbidding wrong, and sincerity. None of these ethical principles has 
an independent point of reference from that of sharīʻa. All these principles are defined in 
reference to sharīʻa. Take for example the idea of justice. 
Acts of justice, he argued, are of three kinds: one is of being unjust towards oneself 
when violating sharīʻa, say, by drinking alcohol and committing adultery [Ibn Taymīya 2002: 
107]. The other kind is to act unjustly toward others, depriving them of their rights according 
to sharīʻa (wealth and property) [Ibn Taymīya 2002: 107]. Finally, an unjust act which 
involves violating the rights of others, say, by stealing in order to commit a forbidden act, and 
thus being unjust towards oneself, as well as, say, by drinking alcohol [Ibn Taymīya 2002: 
107]. Justice therefore is the implementation of sharīʻa [Ibn Taymīya 2002: 107].
This is also true of the principle of commanding right and forbidding wrong [Cook 
2000]. Ibn Taymīya defined the principle as an implementation and enforcement of sharīʻa 
[Ibn Taymīya 2002: 78]. The main reason which justifies political authority is to carry out the 
principle of commanding right and forbidding wrong [Ibn Taymīya 2005a: 73]. 
Ibn Taymīya never denied individuals the right to carry out the principle of commanding 
right according to their abilities. Yet Ibn Taymīya placed so many restrictions on right of 
individuals to carry out the principle leaning heavily to restrict the implementation of the 
principle to political authority and religious scholars [Ibn Taymīya 2002: 79]. Placing moral 
responsibility on political authority only encourages timidity within society and most certainly 
promotes conformity and hypocrisy. It also undermines the principle of sincerity. 
Legalism produces conformity, not sincerity. Ibn Taymīya no doubt highlighted the 
centrality of sincerity, drawing occasionally from a form of suspension of judgment on others. 
However, sincerity and suspension of judgment never developed into a meaningful ethical 
3 Ibn Taymīya is not alone in condemning bidʻa (innovation) as a threat to true faith. For example, see 
al-Shāṭibī 1997 and Ibn Ḥazm 2010. 
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principle. Instead, Ibn Taymīya shifted his focus and concern to what may be called the public 
and practical manifestation of sincerity. According to him, private sincerity was for God to 
judge. Ethically and legally the idea of sincerity has to demonstrate itself in public. This is 
very clear in Ibn Taymīya’s treatment of jihād. Here, the idea of jihād is a clear demonstration 
of love of God (i.e. sincerity). A lover, he argued, has to put his life on the line as testimony 
to and an expression of love. It is evidence and proof of true love. Jihād is a public 
demonstration of sincerity. 
The notion of love was generalized to mean following the path of one’s lover: 
commandments and actions. It also meant avoiding wrongdoings (i.e. prohibited, banned, 
discouraged). Sincerity therefore meant following the true path of that of sharīʻa. Sincerity 
and legalism was one. 
Equating sincerity to public acts led to demoting sincerity to a footnote in Ibn Taymīya’s 
ethical order. The triumph of conformity was assured. No deviation from the true path was 
accepted, which partly illustrates Ibn Taymīya’s view of innovation. 
At the heart of Ibn Taymīya’s objection to the idea of innovation was its potential and/or 
actual threat to domestic order. Conformity assured order, innovation undermined order. 
Nothing more was needed to justify attacking innovation. Sincerity in this context was not 
the appropriate point of reference. Formulated differently one could say that sincerity was for 
God to judge, but innovation was the responsibility of Muslims:
The reason for implementation of sharīʻa was to prevent injustice and 
aggression. If that was the reason, then penalty and punishment in this 
world was disconnected from penalty in the afterlife and vice-versa. That 
is why salaf more often than not tended to execute people of innovation for 
ruining the faith, without asking whether they were non-believers or not [Ibn 
Taymīya 2000 v.1: 348]. 
Ibn Taymīya reproduced an interesting and revealing historical anecdote concerning innovation. 
It was about a religious scholar and head of school in Acre during the “time of crusaders”. His 
name was al-Āmidī. He was accused of innovation. This led Abū ʻAmr Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, who was 
responsible for religious affairs in Acre, to dismiss al-Āmidī from running the school. This, 
according to Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, was more significant than taking back Acre from crusaders! Ibn 
Taymīya, whose name is associated with jihād, approved Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ’s act and added: 
That is despite (the fact that) al-Āmidī was the most knowledgeable of his 
time in kalam and philosophy. And he was the best in adhering to Islam, and 
the most dedicated faithful [Ibn Taymīya 1999:  128]. 
This passage confirms two observations made earlier: first, Ibn Taymīya had no sense of 
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irony or an appreciation of paradox. Second, sincerity is not the central concern or point of 
reference when it comes to judging acts or behavior. Conformity and order were of greater 
value than to bother about the heart! God is the judge, meaning in the afterlife. In this world, 
responsibility of sharīʻa is that of political authority and religious scholars (a form of elitism). 
Taken to its logical conclusion, they are God’s representatives on earth. 
By design or default Ibn Taymīya reduced the ethical to the legal. Pronouncement and 
acts as a definition of faith left little room for contemplation or afterthought. Islamic doctrine 
was a principle of action. The prevalence of God’s words meant enforcement of sharīʻa 
internally and promoting Islam externally through jihād, leading to the implementation 
of sharīʻa. Nothing of value or religious significance was left to chance or opinion. True 
believers are people of action, not contemplation. Sources of knowledge were final, clear and 
detailed. These are Qurʼan, Hadith and consensus based on the views and interpretation of 
salaf. Innovation was not only unnecessary but evil. Innovation strikes at the heart of Islamic 
unity and order, planting seeds of discord and uncertainty.  Ibn Taymīya’s claim of superiority 
(of the Islamic community) was based on the distinctiveness of sharīʻa. Diluting the ethical 
with the legal was therefore a precondition of such a claim. Ibn Taymīya took the notion 
of Islamic moral superiority based on difference and uniqueness to heart. In the following 
section, I offer a detailed outline of such a claim.
II What community?
Ibn Taymīya’s intellectual project is political project. His Islamic community is also political 
community. It has a claim to moral superiority which, for Ibn Taymīya, is both self-evidently 
and historically true. Political authority plays a central role in defining and sustaining such 
a community, ensuring domestic order and promoting Islam (i.e. jihād) externally as an 
implementation to the principle of commanding right and forbidding wrong. Conformity is a 
virtue which ensures domestic peace and order and guarantees mobilization against the other. 
Innovation breeds discord and disunity is the source of evil. Partiality is self-evidently true 
and therefore a virtue. Tranquility and peace at home, permanent state of war with the rest.  
The Islamic community is a distinctive nation based on a simple fundamental 
proposition, namely, that Islam is the only true and genuine religion of God [Ibn Taymīya 
1997: 32–33]. Qur’an was God’s revealed words to be carried out and adhered to literally 
as followed by his Prophet. Sunna was therefore an interpretation and translation of God’s 
message, hence following Sunna was an integral and inseparable part of the true faith [Ibn 
Taymīya 1997: 17–18]. The Prophet’s associates were the closest to him and therefore their 
manner and conduct were to be followed and implemented. The first Islamic century was the 
true century historically and literally.4 No other century could aspire to compete with that 
4 Elevating the first century of Islam beyond history and time has made it difficult for Muslim scholars to 
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golden age in which the true Islamic community had existed. As for others, imitation of that 
golden age is the best and only option available. Reviving and reproducing such a community 
was Ibn Taymīya’s intellectual task. 
Supporting his claim of the moral superiority of the Islamic community, Ibn Taymīya 
reproduced a conversation which was attributed to God and Jesus. “God: I would create a 
nation (which was) my favorite among all others. A nation which was lacking in knowledge 
and tolerance. Jesus exclaimed ‘how it would be possible for a nation lacking in such virtues 
to be God’s favorite?’ God responded by saying that He Himself would provide it with his 
own knowledge and forbearance”. Then Ibn Taymīya commented that this was the quality of 
following the Prophet’s path [Ibn Taymīya 1999: 97]. The Islamic community is a morally 
and scientifically accomplished community, and any suggestion of virtues’ superiority to those 
attributed to the Islamic community is crossing the realm of faith to the world of non-belief [Ibn 
Taymīya 1999: 45–46]. Any shortcomings which such a community may encounter are lesser 
than those of others [Ibn Taymīya 1999:  45–46]. 
Having asserted the moral and other attributes of superiority and distinctiveness of the 
Islamic community, Ibn Taymīya was eager to push that assertion to the limit using the notion 
of contrast and dichotomy (for example believers and non-believers, faithful and hypocrite).   
As for praising and condemnation, love and hate, loyalty and antagonism, 
they would only be established and judged by reference to God’s authority, 
and God’s authority was His Book. So all those who were believers should be 
given our loyalty, and those who were non-believers should be antagonized 
regardless who they were [Ibn Taymīya 2000 v.2: 276]. 
All positive attributes and virtues were given to ahl al-Sunna (i.e. Islamic community), others 
were given negative or inferior attributes [Ibn Taymīya 2000 v.2: 176–177]. Other faiths and 
religions were treated as being abrogated by Islam, incomplete and distorted [Ibn Taymīya 
1997: 32; Ibn Taymīya 2000 v.2: 248]. Their idea of God and attributes of God were simply 
mistaken [Ibn Taymīya 2005b: 53]. 
Therefore, Muslims could not ally themselves with non-Muslims, and every effort 
should be made to differentiate between them, including code of dress [Ibn Taymīya 2000 
v.1: 235]. Maintaining distance from others and refraining from socializing with others were 
also commanded [Ibn Taymīya 2000 v.1: 237].5 Muslims should not imitate non-Muslims 
[Ibn Taymīya 2005b: 54]. Failing to do so was a sign of Islamic decline and weakness [Ibn 
Taymīya 2005b: 54]. History, according to Ibn Taymīya, provided evidence in support of his 
revisit the Islamic faith.
5 The strong anti-sentiment of Ibn Taymīya is in clear contrast to that of the discourse ethics and public 
reason of both Habermas and Rawls in which the emphasis is on civic values, mutual recognition, equality, 
and reciprocity. See Habermas 1994, also see Rawls 2005. 
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assertion. Ibn Taymīya contrasted the reign of the Abbasid caliphs Hārūn al-Rashīd (786–808) 
and al-Mahdī (775–785) [al-Dūrī 1945: 104], in which ahl al-Sunna were in command and 
Islam was triumphant, with that of the Buyid dynasty (932–1062) [Hourani 1991: 489] and 
in which Muslims were in retreat and “crusaders (were) in control of many Islamic lands and 
frontier posts” [Ibn Taymīya 1999: 27–29]. This happened because ahl al-Sunna were feeble 
and weak, whereas the people of innovation had the upper-hand [Ibn Taymīya 1999: 29].
Ibn Taymīya’s mobilization skills were very much evident. Drawing a line between 
those who belonged to the Islamic community and those who did not, and ensuring 
conformity within based on his observation that people were like a pack of cats who tended 
to imitate each other [Ibn Taymīya 2002: 112]. The stage was set to confront the other by 
introducing jihād as the main function of the Islamic community and a testimony to its moral 
exceptionalism [Ibn Taymīya 1997: 39]. 
Placing a high value on jihād was not a particularly difficult exercise for Ibn Taymīya. 
He quoted the prophet as saying “(the) head of faith is Islam, its backbone is praying and 
its crown is jihād for God’s sake.” He then commented that the crown was the highest and 
most honorable part of a body. So was jihād [Ibn Taymīya 2005b: 55]. Nothing, Ibn Taymīya 
asserted, was of higher value than that of jihād [Ibn Taymīya 2005a: 109]. Again jihād was the 
truest expression of a love of God [Ibn Taymīya 1997: 39–40; Ibn Taymīya 2005b: 55–56]. 
Other utilitarian justifications simply followed including considering jihād as the major source 
of revenue for the Islamic community (for example, booty, poll tax and land tax [Ibn Taymīya 
2005a: 41–42, 47] 
By making jihād an operational definition of the doctrine of commanding right and 
forbidding wrong, dependent on the function and role of political authority, Ibn Taymīya 
created and justified the idea that religion and politics were inseparable in Islam [Ibn Taymīya 
2005a: 105]. Political authority was given the mandate to pursue God’s commitment to the 
Islamic community so that His words were to prevail [Ibn Taymīya 2005a: 110–111; Ibn 
Taymīya 2002: 144].6 By elevating political authority to a status of invincibility, Ibn Taymīya 
was led into an intellectual trap from which he was unable to or unwilling to free himself. 
Ibn Taymīya made no distinction between the individual ruler and that of political 
authority. For him political authority and ruler are one. It is rather striking how a project of 
constructing a community was dependent mainly on a single individual to fail or succeed. 
More significantly, Ibn Taymīya was an aware of the real possibility of power abuse by 
authority and its moral decadence as defined by Ibn Taymīya himself [Ibn Taymīya 2000 v.2: 
272–233; Ibn Taymīya 2002: 109–110; Ibn Taymīya 2005a: 51–53]. Be patient, avoid discord 
6 Denying that the notion of jihād is essentially defensive in character would also contradict the 
contemporary search for just global order in which only limited and confined notions of just war would be 
permissible. See Rawls.1993. pp. 36–65.
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and continue to adhere to one’s obligation. That was Ibn Taymīya’s advice [Ibn Taymīya 2002: 
86; Ibn Taymīya 2005a: 39–40]. There was no hint of civil disobedience in Ibn Taymīya’s 
doctrine. Ibn Taymīya offered no explanation as to why any ruler would succeed in meeting 
the requirement of his project except perhaps as an appeal to God. 
Ibn Taymīya’s community is a political community. It is clearly marked against others, 
fulfilling a notion of identity based on partiality and difference. Sameness and conformity are 
characteristic features of its society and individualism and voluntarism are in short supply. 
Individuals have obligations but no sense of right whether it is fortunate to have a good ruler 
or not. Faith is an appropriate description in this context. 
III Ibn Taymīya’s Utilitarianism 
All of Ibn Taymīya’s works contain a reference to and usage of terms which are associated 
with utilitarianism. Pain and pleasure, utility, beneficial and harmful are all too common [Ibn 
Taymīya 2000 v.2: 4–5, 177–178]. Although there is a personal dimension to Ibn Taymīya’s 
notion of utility, namely that sincerity is the main motivation for a Muslim’s act, this is not 
an individualistic principle like that of classic utilitarianism [Hampsher-Monk 1992: 317–
332]. In fact, it is not about personal choice or a personal point of reference as far as pain and 
pleasure are concerned. “Any act which is not intended for God is a false one, even though it 
may cause pleasure” [Ibn Taymīya 2000 v.2: 180]. Thus ideas like the beneficial and harmful, 
right and wrong, etc., are those which correspond to and are in agreement with the purpose 
and intentions of sharīʻa [Ibn Taymīya 2000 v.2: 183].7
Pain and pleasure and thus utility and harm are externally defined and ranked. For Ibn 
Taymīya, the prevalence of God’s words, through enforcement of sharīʻa in which jihād and 
order play a central part, is the principle against which all utilitarian calculations should be 
judged. It comes as no surprise then to find out that all of Ibn Taymīya’s usages of utilitarian 
ideas were in reference to three interrelated notions, namely, jihād, authority, and order. 
Asked who should lead an Islamic army, either a pious but weak Muslim or a wrongdoer 
who is strong, Ibn Taymīya had this to say: “His piety is confined to himself, but his weakness 
affects other Muslims, whereas wrong doing is the responsibility of the impious person, his 
strength is an asset to other Muslims [Ibn Taymīya 2005a: 22]. In this context, Ibn Taymīya 
explained why the Prophet kept Khālid ibn al-Walīd as commander of one of the Islamic 
armies despite Ibn al-Walīd’s wild conduct and unrestrained behavior which bordered on the 
un-Islamic [Ibn Taymīya 2005a: 23].
Thus as long as an Islamic ruler was carrying out his major duties including commanding 
7 Moving the issue of identity from the sphere of power and political authority to that of civil society is 
one major attempt to counter the mobilization tendency of identity based on an anti-sentiment towards others, 
which is clearly the case with Ibn Taymīya. See Habermas. 2011. 
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right and forbidding wrong (i.e. order and jihād), one should tolerate if not overlook his other 
shortcomings and wrongdoings. He explains the rational of jihād when necessarily leading 
to the killing of non-Muslims as “shortening their life span” [Ibn Taymīya 2002: 145]. Ibn 
Taymīya used a very utilitarian expression, namely “minimizing their harm” to other Muslims 
and to Islam [Ibn Taymīya 2000 v.2: 294]. 
Opposing established political authority was therefore seen as usually leading to “greater 
harm” than good, including the possibility of discord and wasting resources necessary for 
the permanent act of jihād. Muslims should adhere to their part of the bargain and meet their 
obligations to the ruler, even though the latter might be a tyrant and unjust [Ibn Taymīya 
2002: 86; Ibn Taymīya 2005a: 39–40].
Ibn Taymīya never seemed to see the sense of irony in his doctrine nor to appreciate 
and take note of the paradox. Having ranked values in final and absolute terms, others have 
to accommodate themselves to such a requirement. Ibn Taymīya was fully aware how far his 
idealized notion of authority was from reality and history never supported his aspirations. 
That did not count for much in Ibn Taymīya’s scheme of things. One cannot of course deny 
the intense desire of Ibn Taymīya or the Islamic nation to regain power. Desire, however, 
as we all know, remains a desire. This has not dampened the spirit and determination of his 
followers, nor those who claim to be carrying Ibn Taymīya’s ‘torch’ in an attempt to make 
sure that God will have the final say.8 Ibn Taymīya loved to remind his reader that God would 
always prevail. 
Conclusion 
Ibn Taymīya’s community is an imagined community, and despite his reference to the first 
original Islamic community, his is a product of deliberate intellectual construction. Ibn 
Taymīya’s image of the Islamic community is one possible construction and certainly not 
the final word on such a community. The major appeal of Ibn Taymīya’s community is its 
simplicity; at peace with itself, orderly and homogenous, mobilized clearly marked from the 
outside world with which it is always in a state of war. All major Islamic doctrines including 
sharīʻa and ethics, commanding right and forbidding wrong, and consensus and public interest 
expressed in utilitarian terminology, were interpreted to support domestic peace and order and 
permanent mobilization in an endless state of war with others. It also has an emotional appeal 
reinforcing a mild sense of vanity to an extreme form of moral supremacy and superiority. 
Identity is markedly stated, final and absolute. There is no self-doubt and no uncertainty. The 
human mind literally would be in a state of stillness. For a man who was hostile to logic this 
8 Ibn Taymīya’s rejection of pluralism or even a hint of pluralism is self-evident. This would highlight 
the difficulty if not impossibility of engaging such religious narrative with deliberate discourse. See Rawls. 
1997 and Rawls. 2005. 
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is no mean achievement. Ibn Taymīya, despite his selective method and ad hoc interpretation, 
was nevertheless able to construct a simple model of an imagined Islamic community.  
But there is a much darker side to Ibn Taymīya’s construction. Current literature from 
psychology, sociology and anthropology provide ample evidence that violence is only 
possible when marking others out as outsiders, not belonging and different [Foucault 2001; 
Fromm 2002]. Ibn Taymīya’s intellectual project was to nourish, support and celebrate the 
dichotomy of those who belong and those who did not. Instead of using religion for positive 
self-fulfillment, Ibn Taymīya was occupied with marking the other. 
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